Network competition and entry deterrence by Calzada, J & Valletti, TM
Network Competition and Entry Deterrence∗
Joan Calzada†
Universitat de Barcelona and IREA-PPRE
Tommaso M. Valletti‡
Imperial College London, University of Rome and CEPR
First version: November 2005
This version: May 2007
Abstract
We develop a model of logit demand that extends to a multi-firm industry
the traditional duopoly framework of network competition. Firstly, we show
that incumbents establish ineﬃciently the reciprocal access charge below cost
when they compete in prices, but they behave eﬃciently if they compete in
utilities. Secondly, we study how incumbents determine the industry-wide
access charge under the threat of entry. We show that incumbents may ac-
commodate all possible entrants, only a group of them, or may completely
deter entry. When entry deterrence is the preferred option, incumbents dis-
tort the access charge upwards.
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The telecommunications sector has been liberalised almost everywhere in the
world. In spite of this, regulation remains, though the emphasis has been shifted
from direct control of end-user prices to market supervision intended to guarantee
the development of competition. In this pursuit, the regulation of interconnec-
tion charges is a key instrument. Telecommunications operators interconnect their
networks to provide consumers with benefits from network externalities. Despite
vigorous competition in the market, each operator is a monopolist over its sub-
scribers’ access lines. When a customer belonging to one network calls a subscriber
of another network, only this second network is able to terminate the call. The
same situation arises when the call is reversed, making interconnection a “two-way”
access problem.1 Because this need to have a competitor terminate calls is recipro-
cal, regulatory authorities have not traditionally viewed this termination bottleneck
with great concern. Most countries make interconnection mandatory but allow op-
erators to determine bilaterally identical reciprocal access charges. The requirement
of reciprocity has been introduced to avoid the possibility of operators establishing a
double mark-up. This paper shows that this approach might not always be enough
to prevent anti-competitive strategies. We draw a distinction between industries
with a stable market structure and industries where entry can occur. We show that,
in the first case, incumbents may reach eﬃcient agreements over reciprocal access
charges. However, when incumbents are threatened by the possibility of entry, they
may negotiate a higher reciprocal access charge to deter entry.
Recent literature has investigated the potentially collusive role of access (whole-
sale) charges in raising consumer (retail) prices. The seminal works of Armstrong
(1998), and Laﬀont et al. (1998a and 1998b) (henceforth ALRT) show that firms can
use above-cost access charges as a mechanism to obtain higher profits when firms
compete in linear retail prices. However, this collusive result is not robust under
more sophisticated pricing strategies. ALRT demonstrate that, with two-part retail
prices, the access charge has a neutral eﬀect on profits: any possible access profit
would simply be passed on to customers via a reduction in their subscription fee.
The framework of ALRT has been extended in several directions. Gans and King
(2001) show that when the operators use price discrimination between on-net and
oﬀ-net calls the profit neutrality of access charges no longer holds. Firms can soften
price competition and obtain higher profits by establishing access charges below
cost. Valletti and Cambini (2005) introduce investments in the ALRT framework
and show that firms are keen to set above cost access charges in order to weaken
competition over investments. Jeon et al. (2004) and Berger (2005) study access
charges in the presence of call externalities.
One common feature of all these papers is that each considers only a single market
structure: almost invariably a duopoly.2 The objective of this paper is to relax this
1For a complete review of the literature on access charges see Laﬀont and Tirole (2000), Arm-
strong (2002), Vogelsang (2003), and Peitz et al. (2004).
2Jeon (2006) is the only exception we are aware of. He considers a general model with many
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assumption in order to assess the impact that the negotiation of access charges
by incumbents may have on entry. The possibility of entry is clearly a relevant
and realistic problem. In fixed telephony, technological progress has lowered entry
barriers. In cellular telephony, there are constraints that limit the availability of
electromagnetic spectrum, but entry is made possible by improvements in the use
of frequencies and releases of additional chunks of spectrum. Countries such as
Australia, New Zealand, the US and the UK are liberalising the spectrum market,
e.g., by introducing “spectrum trading” which allows, say, a broadcaster to use its
frequencies to supply mobile telephony services. The emergence of mobile virtual
network operators (MVNOs) in most European countries and in the US provides
an additional opportunity for entry even for operators that do not own licensed
spectrum.
We analyse the case where incumbent networks negotiate reciprocal access charges
that are valid industry-wide, i.e., they apply to all competing firms, both incum-
bents and entrants. This assumption reflects the present regulation of the European
Commission and the Federal Communications Commission in the US, both of which
require non-discriminatory access charges. We develop a model with network-based
price discrimination where profits are not neutral with respect to access charges.
Incumbents recognise that the level negotiated for access charges aﬀects ex post
profitability, and thus the attractiveness of entry ex ante. We identify the circum-
stances when incumbents want to distort the access charges away from the eﬃcient
level in order to deter entry of potential rivals.
A motivating example An interesting case study of the problem we exam-
ine here can be found in the recent history of the Turkish mobile industry.3 From
1998 through 2001 Turkey experienced a GSM duopoly with two incumbents, called
Turkcell and Telsim. In 1998, the incumbents quickly reached an interconnection
agreement. Access charges for mobile-to-mobile calls were set at around 1.5 euro-
cents/min. These access charges between the incumbents remained unchanged until
March 2001, just before the Turkish government issued two new licences. The first
licence was awarded to Aria (owned by a consortium of Is, a Turkish commercial
bank, and TIM, the mobile phone arm of Telecom Italia) and the second one to
Aycell, owned by the incumbent fixed-line operator, Turk Telekom. The new in-
terconnection agreement, which was to be applied to all operators, increased the
terminating charges to 20 eurocents/min. Aria and Aycell, who still needed to in-
vest in network rollout, struggled and in 2003 they merged to form Avea. Thus
the industry structure that was supposed to comprise four operators was reduced to
three. Only then did the industry regulator obtain the power to intervene directly
in interconnection and issue an “Ordinance on Access and Interconnection”. In Oc-
networks, but his interest is very diﬀerent from ours. He focuses on non-reciprocal access charges
that are set by a regulator instead of reciprocal and negotiated access charges, generalising the
Eﬃcient Component Pricing Rule. He also does not consider the possibility of entry.
3This example is described in full by Atiyas and Dogan (2006).
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tober 2003, the regulator negotiated the access rates at about 12 eurocents/min,
further reduced to 8 eurocents/min in February 2006. Turkey remains one of the
most concentrated markets in Europe, and analysts do not predict further entry
in the short term. In summary, in Turkey there had been a pattern of very low
access charges in the duopoly period with a stable market structure, followed by a
very sharp increase in the common non-discriminatory charge just before entrants
started to invest. As a possible consequence of this increase, fewer entrants than
anticipated decided to enter. The access charge then went down again, although
only in response to negotiations with the Turkish regulator. It is this relationship
between access charges and entry that our model looks at.4
Contribution to the literature This paper contributes to the literature in
three ways. First, we show the specific impact of entry on the negotiation of ac-
cess charges by incumbents. This has not been studied before in the literature on
“two-way” access pricing. We characterise how incumbents set industry-wide access
charges when they face entrants. The incumbents can distort the reciprocal access
charge away from the ex-post (i.e. after entry has occurred) profit maximising level
in order to reduce the attractiveness of entry. We show that, when incumbents find
it worthwhile to deter entry, they naturally distort the access mark-up upwards.
Thus, to the extent that incumbents can be challenged by entry, our results provide
some support to the regulatory concern that access charges may be set “too high”,
rather than “too low”. This result oﬀers a conclusion opposite to that of Gans and
King (2001) and has important implications in terms of regulatory policy.
Our second and more general contribution is to show in an entry-deterrence
game that apparently innocuous terms applied uniformly to all industry players
can be used by incumbents to manage industry structure to maximise their profits
(subject of course to technological constraints on entry). In particular, we find that
the uniform access charges established by the incumbents determine the number
of firms that enter the market. At a given fixed cost of entry, incumbents may
decide to accommodate entry, or to accommodate only a subset of entrants and
deter the others. We also find that successful deterrence does not depend upon
industrial concentration in the manner which one might expect, as incumbents may
find it profitable to set an access charge that permits the entry of a whole group
of entrants. This result provides an explanatory mechanism for the observation of
Bernheim (1984) that “the stable sizes of an industry (i.e., levels of concentration at
which operating firms successfully deter entry) tend to be staggered (for example,
no further entry occurs if and only if there are two, six, ten or fifteen firms)”. This
dynamic process is of particular interest in an industry such as telecommunications:
Fixed costs of entry can be assumed to decrease over time because of some exogenous
technological progress, which provides an engine to our mechanism that generates
“staggered” market structures.
4We note that the regulated termination rates in the later years of the Turkish experience are
also mixed with the regulation of fixed-to-mobile calls that we do not analyse in our model.
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The third contribution of the paper is to extend the traditional duopoly frame-
work introduced by ALRT to allow the analysis of a multi-firm industry. This
extension allows us to analyse the entry game. We notice that a fully satisfactory
model in which the access price is used as a deterrent must be an oligopolistic one,
rather than simply a duopoly model where one firm is considered the incumbent and
the other an entrant. With a single incumbent operator there is little reason to have
an access price in the absence of entry as there would be no interconnection. An
oligopolistic model is also relevant from a policy perspective since regulators typi-
cally intervene less to regulate access prices under oligopoly. In order to consider
this oligopolistic interaction we employ a model with logit demand.5 One advan-
tage of the logit formulation is that each network competes simultaneously with all
other networks and not only with its immediate neighbours. This property is useful
analytically in our multi-firm setting, making the study very tractable. We study
the negotiation of the access charge under two kinds of strategic interaction among
firms, when firms compete in prices and in utilities. Our analysis could also be
carried under the Hotelling product diﬀerentiation framework that is usually used
in the literature on access charge, extended to the Salop circular city model.6 When
firms compete in prices our findings generalise to the multi-firm case the conclusion
of Gans and King (2001) that operators are interested in setting the access charges
below cost to soften competition. This result also implies that firms introduce in-
eﬃciencies as oﬀ-net calls are priced “too low”, i.e., below marginal cost, and thus
destroy some potential gains from trade. We show that this ineﬃciency does not
arise when the strategic variable is utility instead of price. In this case, incumbents
in a multi-firm industry have an incentive to set access charge at cost when they do
not face the threat of entry.
The reason for studying both kinds of strategic interaction among firms is two-
fold. Firstly, the “trick” of using competition in utilities instead of prices is often
employed in the duopoly framework of ALRT and, more generally, in the literature
on duopolistic price discrimination (e.g., Armstrong and Vickers, 2001; Rochet and
Stole, 2002). This transformation of the problem simplifies computations and is in-
nocuous in the absence of externalities. We conduct a comparison of the two kinds of
competition in the context of our model of N-network competition, with and with-
5For a complete and detailed study of the logit demand models see Anderson et al. (1992).
Doganouglu and Tauman (2002) consider the negotiation of a reciprocal access charge in a duopoly
with logit demands when operators establish linear prices.
6We have also studied Salop models under both competition in prices and utilities. In the
Salop circular city model, we obtained closed-form solutions for the general case of N -network
competition when firms compete in utilities. When firms compete in prices, however, the problem
becomes more cumbersome in the presence of externalities, given the non-symmetric impact of a
firm’s price change on the rivals’ market shares. We have obtained closed-form solutions only after
fixing the number N to specific values. In both cases, the results obtained are the same as those
obtained under the logit formulation, which allows a more general treatment under both kinds of
strategic interaction.
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out externalities induced by oﬀ-net price discrimination. We show how competition
in utilities and in prices yield diﬀerent outcomes as long as access prices diﬀer from
costs. In particular, when access prices are below (above) cost, then competition in
prices yields higher (lower) profits than competition in utilities. Secondly, because
competition in utilities results in simpler expressions in the general case, we adopt
it to simplify exposition when we deal with the entry game.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 analyses a model
of network competition among a generic number of firms. First, we assume that
networks compete in prices, and then we study competition in utilities. Section 2
considers the negotiation of access charges when there is the possibility of entry.
Section 3 argues that our main results on entry deterrence are robust in the face of
biased calling patterns, where customers call some specific users more often (“friends
& family”). Section 4 discusses our main conclusions.
1 Negotiation of access charges in a multi-firm
industry
We analyse the negotiation of reciprocal interconnection charges by a group of un-
regulated telecommunications operators that do not face the threat of entry. First,
we consider the case where firms compete with discriminatory call prices and fixed
subscription fees and afterwards we present the same model with firms competing
in discriminatory call prices and net utilities.
Consider a group of N ≥ 2 telecommunications firms that simultaneously com-
pete against each other. All firms incur a fixed cost f to serve each subscriber. The
marginal cost of providing a telephone call consists in the terminating and originat-
ing cost, c0, and the conveying cost, c1. As a result, the total marginal cost of an
on-net call initiated and terminated on the same network is c ≡ 2c0+ c1. The firms
also pay each other a reciprocal termination access charge t when a call initiated
on a network is terminated on a diﬀerent network. Thus, for an oﬀ-net call, the
economic marginal cost is still c but the “perceived” marginal cost for the network
that initiates the call is c1 + c0 + t. Following the notation of Laﬀont et al. (1998b)
we write the access charge as t = mc + c0, where m represents the mark-up of
interconnection charges relative to total marginal costs. Taking this notation into
account, the oﬀ-net “perceived” marginal cost is simply c0 + c1 + t = c(1 +m).
The N firms have complete coverage and compete for a continuum of consumers
of unit mass. Consumers call each other with equal probabilities. Market shares are
derived using a logit model. Consumers have idiosyncratic tastes for each operator.
A customer subscribed to firm i obtains the following quasi-linear utility
y + v0 + vi(p) + τ i,
where y is the income of the consumer, v0 is a fixed utility term derived from
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subscription that is assumed to be high enough to guarantee full coverage (i.e.,
consumers never buy the outside option) and vi(p) ≡ maxq ui(q) − pq denotes
the net indirect utility from making q calls at a price p and is discussed below.
These terms are non-stochastic and reflect the population’s tastes. The term τ i is
randomly drawn and reflects the idiosyncrasies of individual tastes. This random
taste parameter is known to the consumer but is unobserved by the firms.
Firms oﬀer multi-part tariﬀs and price discriminate between on-net and oﬀ-net
calls. As a result, consumers pay a tariﬀ with the following structure




where Fi is the fixed subscription fee that consumers pay to firm i, pii and qii are
the price and quantity of on-net calls, and pij and qij are the price and quantity of
oﬀ-net calls from network i to network j 6= i. The net surplus for being subscribed
to network i is
wi(pii, pij, τ i) =
NX
j=1
αjv(pij)− Fi + τ i, (1)
where αj denotes the market share of firm j. A consumer subscribes to firm i
when wi(pii, pij, τ i) ≥ wj(pjj, pji, τ j). The logit demand functions are obtained by
assuming that all τ i are i.i.d. and follow the double exponential distribution with
zero mean. As shown by Anderson et al. (1992), in this case the market share αi of











where σ is a positive constant, which is positively related to the degree of product
diﬀerentiation. It can be shown that when σ → 0 the variance of τ i also tends
to zero. In this case, the multinomial logit reduces to a deterministic model. By
contrast, when σ → ∞, the variance of τ i tends to infinity and all alternatives are
equally possible.
We consider the following timing of the game. First, the N firms decide co-
operatively a common reciprocal mark-up m for access. Second, firms determine
their multi-part tariﬀs by competing in call prices and fixed subscription fees or net
utilities. Third, consumers subscribe to one network in the way described above.
1.1 Competition in prices
We solve the model by backward induction. First, we determine the multi-part tariﬀs
in the second stage of the game and then we study how the networks negotiate the
reciprocal access charge. To begin with, we state without proof the well-known
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result that firms set call prices equal to the perceived marginal costs. This result
is general both to competition in call prices and fixed fees and to competition in
call prices and net utility.7 The call prices oﬀered by firm i are: pii = c on-net and








Diﬀerentiation of the profit function with respect to the fixed subscription fee of

















where the market share αi is given by equation (2). In order to compute this
condition in a symmetric equilibrium when αi = αj = 1/N , it is useful to consider









N [Nσ − (v(c)− v(c(1 +m))] .
Solving the first order condition we obtain in a symmetric equilibrium
Fi = f +
Nσ − (v(c)− v(c(1 +m))
N − 1 −
cm(N − 2)q(c(1 +m))
N
. (4)
When m = 0, equation (4) simplifies to
Fi = f +
Nσ
N − 1 ,
which further simplifies to Fi = f + 2σ when N = 2. This result implies that, in a
duopoly with zero mark-ups, the fixed subscription fee is simply equal to the direct
subscription cost plus a term that reflects idiosyncratic tastes and is equivalent to
the standard Hotelling term of horizontal diﬀerentiation.
Returning now to the general case, the next proposition shows how the networks
establish the mark-up m in the first stage of the game.8
7If, on the contrary, firms oﬀered call prices diﬀerent from perceived marginal cost, they could
always make greater profits by oﬀering calls at the perceived marginal cost and adjusting the fixed
fee/net utility. This result arises because all customers are identical with respect to call usage. This
is found in most of the literature on two-way access pricing in the typical Hotelling framework with
multi-part tariﬀs, as all consumers have a common call demand and only diﬀer from an additive
parameter of horizontal diﬀerentiation. See also Yin (2004) and Reitzes and Woroch (2006) for
related results in models with logit demands.
8We assume that an equilibrium exists, which requires σ to be suﬃciently high, i.e., products
are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated. See De Palma and Leruth (1993) for a proof of this result in a logit
framework with network externalities.
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Proposition 1. When incumbents compete in discriminatory call prices and
subscription fees they establish a reciprocal access charge below cost, m < 0, and
earn a profit strictly greater than σ/(N − 1).
Proof . Substituting the subscription fee from equation (4) in the profit function
(3) yields
πi(N,m) =
Nσ − (v(c)− v(c(1 +m))




Diﬀerentiating the profit function with respect to the mark-up m and considering




c[cm(N − 1)q0(c(1 +m))− q(c(1 +m))]
N2(N − 1) . (6)
Evaluating this expression at m = 0, equation (6) can be simplified to
∂πi
∂m
|m=0= − cq(c)N2(N − 1) < 0.
Therefore, in equilibrium, ∂πi∂m |m=0< 0 and the chosen mark-upm is always negative.
Also note that, whenm = 0, the profit function in (5) takes the following expression:
πi =
σ
N − 1 (7)
which represents a lower bound to the profit when m < 0. ¥
This proposition generalises the findings of Gans and King (2001) to a multi-firm
industry when there are logit demands. The intuition is that, when m is negative,
customers want to subscribe to smaller networks, because relatively more of their
calls will be cheaper oﬀ-net calls. When this happens, firms are less interested in
building market share. As a result of the negative mark-up, price competition is
decreased and higher profits are obtained.
In our set up eﬃciency dictates that call prices should be equal to marginal
costs. While this is achieved in equilibrium for on-net calls, a direct consequence of
Proposition 1 is that oﬀ-net prices are ineﬃciently low as pij = c(1 +m) < c and
“too many” oﬀ-net calls are placed. This discussion is summarised in the following
corollary.
Corollary 1. When incumbents compete in discriminatory call prices and sub-
scription fees, the negotiation of reciprocal access charges leads to ineﬃciently low
oﬀ-net retail prices.
Proposition 1 only establishes that operators would choose an access charge below
cost, but it does not characterise the optimal reciprocal charge. We can find suﬃcient
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conditions that result in a “bill-and-keep” system, that is an arrangement where
incumbents agree on t = 0 and do not pay or receive any access charge.9
Corollary 2. Suﬃcient conditions for a “bill-and-keep” system to emerge are:
i) c is suﬃciently small, or ii) call demand is suﬃciently inelastic.(iii) A “bill-
and-keep” system is more likely to be adopted the smaller the number of competing
firms.
Proof. The optimal mark-up is determined by equation (6). (i) Take the case
of low c (c −→ 0). We can characterise the asymptotic behaviour of equation (6) by
concentrating only on the higher-order terms. In this case equation (6) simplifies to
∂πi
∂m
|c−→0= −cqN2(N − 1) ,
which is always negative for any value of m, thus operators agree on a “bill-and-
keep” system. By continuity, a “bill-and-keep” system is chosen for a suﬃciently
low value of c.
(ii) Denote as ε the elasticity of demand for calls. Imagine ε→ 0 (i.e., q0p/q → 0).
Equation (6) can be rewritten as
∂πi
∂m
|ε−→0= −cqN2(N − 1) ,
which is always negative for any value ofm. Therefore operators negotiate the lowest
possible access charge, i.e., they agree on a “bill-and-keep” system. By continuity,
a “bill-and-keep” system is chosen for a suﬃciently low value of ε.
(iii) If an interior solution to equation (6) exists (i.e., m is negative but not as
low as a “bill-and-keep” system), the optimal m is given by:
m =
q(c(1 +m))
m(N − 1)q0(c(1 +m))
.
Using the definition of elasticity, and the fact that at equilibrium p = c(1 +m), the
previous expression can be re-arranged as
m = − 1
(N − 1)ε+ 1
which is lower (i.e., closer to a “bill-and-keep” system) the lower is N . ¥
This finding shows that a “bill-and-keep” system may emerge purely for strategic
reasons. Obviously, this result would be reinforced if we took into account transac-
tion costs, for instance, billing and monitoring costs. Yet this conclusion is somewhat
unappealing for two reasons. First, incumbent operators distort oﬀ-net prices, thus
9We do not allow for negative access charges, i.e., t < 0 is ruled out. See Section 2 below for a
discussion.
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some potential gains from trade are lost that could be realised if the access charge
were set at cost rather than below cost. Second, regulators are typically concerned
that the mark-ups set by the operators may be too high rather than too low, a result
that does not arise in our model. In the next section we show that the first intuition
is somehow correct and firms set eﬃcient access charges if they compete in utilities
instead of prices. Section 2 confirms the regulators’ concern about “too high” access
charges when incumbents are challenged by potential entrants.
1.2 Competition in utilities
We now consider the determination of reciprocal access charges when firms compete
in discriminatory call prices and utilities. From equation (1), and again using the
result that call prices are set equal to the perceived marginal cost, the expected fixed
subscription fee can be written as follows:




As explained in the introduction, our interest in analysing competition in utilities
is two-fold. Firstly, we want to compare competition in prices and in utilities to
check under what circumstances one could reasonably assume that the two kinds
of strategic interaction yield the same outcomes and, if they do not, we want to
determine how they diﬀer. Secondly, modelling competition in utilities delivers
simpler expressions than competition in prices and this facilitates the analysis of
the entry game studied in Section 2.
Consider the profit function in equation (3). After substitution of the market
shares αi and αj as defined by equation (2) and the subscription fee defined above,
we diﬀerentiate the profit with respect to the net utility wi. Assuming a symmetric
equilibrium with wi = wj, for j = 1, ..., N , we obtain
wi = v(c)− f −
N
N − 1σ +
(N − 2)[cmq(c(1 +m)) + v(c(1 +m))− v(c)]
N
. (8)
Note that when N = 2 this simplifies to wi = v(c) − f − 2σ. In the general
case, the fixed subscription fee can be immediately derived from the equilibrium net
consumer utility:
Fi = f +
N
N − 1σ −
(N − 2)cmq(c(1 +m)) + v(c)− v(c(1 +m))
N
. (9)
When N = 2 the subscription fee simplifies to Fi = f+2σ−[v(c)−v(c(1+m)]/2,
thus the access charge only aﬀects the oﬀ-net traﬃc (via the oﬀ-net calling price) but
not the net utility wi. The intuition is that any losses or gains in consumer surplus
due to above or below marginal cost pricing for oﬀ-net calls are fully compensated
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for by the firms through the adjustment of the subscription fee. However, equation
(8) shows that the neutrality of the mark-up m on the net utility wi does not
generalise for N > 2. In fact, we next show that an increase of m above 0 lowers
the subscription fee but has a negative eﬀect on the net utility oﬀered to consumers
in equilibrium.
The impact of m on Fi can be seen from (9): if m > 0, then v(c) > v(c(1 +m)).
Therefore, with a positive mark-up the last term in (9) is negative overall and
the subscription fee decreases. This has a positive impact on the utility oﬀered to
customers. However, an increase inm also leads to an increase in the price of oﬀ-net
calls, and thus the indirect utility from oﬀ-net calls decreases. From (8) it is clear
that the net eﬀect is negative as
∆ = cmq(c(1 +m))− [v(c)− v(c(1 +m))] < 0, (10)
where the strict inequality stems from the fact that ∆ represents the classic “dead-
weight loss” when prices diﬀer from marginal costs.10 Similarly, it can be shown
that if m < 0 the subscription fee increases but, overall, net utility decreases.
We are now a position to determine the negotiation of the access mark-up in the
first stage of the game.
Proposition 2. When incumbents compete in discriminatory call prices and
net utilities they establish a reciprocal access charge with a zero mark-up over cost,
m = 0.
Proof . Simplifying the profit function in equation (3) with the equilibrium value
for wi from (8) we obtain
πi(N,m) =
σ




where the deadweight loss ∆, defined as in (10), is minimised for m = 0. We can
therefore conclude that, for any number N of incumbents, m = 0 is the unique
solution that maximises profits. ¥
In order to understand this proposition,11 note that, when the incumbents set
a positive access mark-up, two eﬀects arise. The mark-up has a positive direct
eﬀect on profits as it generates access revenues. However, these access revenues
are dissipated by a negative indirect eﬀect: competition forces the firms to grant
utility to consumers by pushing down fixed subscription fees. In addition, the fixed
subscription fee must compensate for the loss in net utility from making oﬀ-net calls.
10To confirm that ∆, as expressed by equation (10), is the “deadweight loss” when m 6= 0 and
thus p = c(1 + m) 6= c, notice that the first term on the RHS of (10) is (p − c)q = cmq, i.e.,
it corresponds to the change in firm’s profits, while the second term is the change is consumer
surplus.
11Armstrong (2002, fn 102) also notes this finding in a Hotelling duopoly setting with competition
in utilities.
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Overall, the indirect eﬀect more than prevails over the direct eﬀect and, as a result,
a positive mark-up reduces profits. Similarly, a negative mark-up allows an increase
in fixed fees because consumers pay less for oﬀ-net calls, but it induces access losses
that cannot be recovered via an equal increase in fixed fees.
All in all, when firms compete in net utilities the optimal mark up is exactly zero.
The “perceived” marginal cost for oﬀ-net calls then coincides with the true economic
marginal cost, and oﬀ-net and on-net prices both induce an eﬃcient number of calls,
pii = pij = c. For a given number of competing firms, it then follows that the
industry is able to “self-regulate” as private negotiations over access charges achieve
eﬃciency.
Corollary 3. When incumbents compete in discriminatory call prices and net
utilities, the negotiation of reciprocal access charges is eﬃcient.
We end this section by conducting a comparison of the equilibrium profits under
the two modes on competition, price and net utilities.
Proposition 3. (i) If the access charges are exogenously set at m = 0, competi-
tion in prices and competition in utilities yield the same equilibrium profits. If m < 0
(respectively,m > 0), competition in prices yields strictly higher (respectively, lower)
profits than competition in utilities. (ii) With endogenous access charges, competi-
tion in prices yields strictly higher profits than competition in utilities for any value
of N .
Proof . (i) Profits when competition is in prices are given by equation (5), while
equation (11) is valid when competition is in utilities. Fixing a certain mark-up m
and taking the diﬀerence we obtain:
πi(N,m | prices)− πi(N,m | utilities) = −v(c)− v(c(1 +m))N2(N − 1) .
The RHS is zero when m = 0, while it is positive (negative) when m < 0 (m > 0).
(ii) When m is endogenous, firms choose diﬀerent mark-ups under the two kinds
of strategic interaction. Firms choose m = 0 when they compete in utilities, while
they choose m < 0 when they compete in prices. Thus a strictly lower bound to
profits under price competition is found when m = 0. Putting this together, and
recalling result (i), we find that
πi(N,m < 0 | prices) > πi(N,m = 0 | prices) = πi(N,m = 0 | utilities). ¥
The results of Proposition 3 are interesting for several reasons. First, it is of
interest to compare equilibrium profits under the two competition modes when m is
set at some exogenous level as this may correspond tom being exogenously regulated.
The specific valuem = 0 is relevant since it is chosen by regulators in many practical
circumstances. In addition, by setting m = 0 the regulator can remove calling
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externalities that would otherwise exist because m 6= 0 creates diﬀerences between
on-net and oﬀ-net prices.
With competition in prices, firms prefer m < 0 because in this case customers
want to belong to a relatively smaller network and this is a way to soften price
competition and extract higher fixed subscription fees from customers. Under utility
competition, if m < 0 firms have to compensate for the reduction of oﬀ-net revenues
with an increase in the subscription fee, but this increase does not compensate for
the decrease of access revenues and therefore firms make lower profits than under
price competition. Conversely, when m > 0, price competition is made tougher and
the loss in profits is greater under price competition than competition in utilities
(part (i) of Proposition 3).
In addition, the proposition shows that, when incumbents choose the common
access mark-up endogenously, they can do better (i.e., achieve higher profits despite
a decrease in total welfare) in the price setting game than in the utility setting game
(part (ii)). Under competition in utilities firms do not want to introduce external-
ities by distorting the access mark-up, otherwise they would have to compensate
their customers. This diﬀers from competition in prices where externalities can be
introduced via negative mark-ups to soften competition.
2 Zero mark-ups or entry deterrence?
The previous section has shown that competing incumbent networks that do not face
potential entrants choose access charges either at or below cost. The particular value
for the access charge depends on the type of strategic interaction among operators.
While these findings have an impact on eﬃciency, in our model above cost access
charges turn out never to be chosen, which is one of the main concerns of regulators.
This section examines the robustness of our results when entry is possible. We
investigate the setting of an access charge that is non-discriminatory, i.e., it applies
both to incumbents and to potential entrants.12 Introducing the possibility of entry
into our model would pose little challenge if an incumbent monopolist or a group of
incumbents could discriminate by setting very high access rates selectively on calls
originated by entrants. In such a case, since the incumbents expect to lose from any
increase in the number of competitors, they will discriminate against entrants and
possibly foreclose entry.
The introduction of a non-discriminatory requirement makes the determination
of the reciprocal access charge an interesting problem from an economic point of
view. The incumbents face a trade-oﬀ. If they set a eﬃcient (i.e., industry profit
maximising) mark-up along the lines described in the previous section, they max-
12In the United States, the 1996 Telecommunications Act establishes that the access charges
should be non-discriminatory. The European Union establishes the same principle in the Access
Directive 2002/19/EC.
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imise profits ex post for a given number of firms. However, this makes entry more
appealing ex ante, thus potentially attracting too many entrants and reducing prof-
its. Faced with this threat, incumbents may want to distort the mark-up away from
eﬃciency in order to limit the attractiveness of entry. Notice that the logit model we
employ implies that every firm is symmetric ex post, i.e., after entry has occurred.
Thus the only possible reason to distort the mark-up is to produce an impact on
entry, which is the correct benchmark given our interest in entry deterrence. If en-
trants were asymmetrically placed, there could be additional reasons to try to aﬀect
the terms of interconnection (Carter and Wright, 2003).
To analyse how incumbents negotiate the industry access charge ex ante we
consider the following four-stage game. At stage one, incumbent networks establish
an interconnection arrangement that is valid for all industry participants and commit
to not modifying it if entry occurs.13 At stage two, entrants decide whether or not
to enter the industry. If they enter, they pay a fixed entry cost K, which is the
same for each. This cost is only paid by actual entrants and not by the incumbents
(they may have already sunk it). At stage three and four, all operators (incumbents
and actual entrants) compete against each other and customers subscribe in the way
described in the previous section.
The crucial assumption in this sequence is that incumbents are committed to
(non-discriminatory) pre-entry access prices following any possible entry. While
the non-discriminatory feature has already been discussed, we notice here that the
possibility of setting the access charge strategically to deter entry is based on the
commitment to maintain the access charge once entry has occurred. This assumption
creates an opportunity for a strategic behaviour. We justify it by noting that: a)
in practice interconnection deals are changed very rarely - the Turkish example
discussed in the Introduction is a case in point; b) commitment can be sustained
through regulatory environments where telecommunications operators typically oﬀer
binding access undertakings and so cannot easily change them ex post.
We solve the game backwards. Stages three and four are identical to the games
examined in Section 1. At stage three all operators (incumbents and actual entrants)
compete against each other, and at stage four customers subscribe to one network.
The equilibrium profits in stage 1 are given by equation (5) or (11), depending on
the type of strategic interaction being considered. The profit functions depend only
on the total number N of competing firms and on the reciprocal access mark-up,
m. Thus the stage-3 equilibrium profit per firm can be written as π(N,m). Now
consider a potential entrant at stage 2. It decides to enter if and only if, by becoming
one of the N competing firms, it is able to recover its fixed entry costs. Entry stops
when fixed costs cannot be recovered by ex post profits. Thus entry in stage 2 can
13Given the ex-post symmetry of the logit model, if incumbents negotiate an access charge among
themselves that diﬀers from the conditions oﬀered to new entrants, this would be immediately
considered discriminatory. Our negotiation set-up could also be re-interpreted as a set of bilateral
negotiations among identical firms under the non-discrimination requirement.
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occur if it is possible to find a range π(N,m) > K compatible with entry. As K
declines, more firms are expected to enter, other factors being equal. In stage 1 the
incumbents, by choosing m, can indeed aﬀect the level of entry.
In the analysis that follows we assume that stage-3 equilibrium profits satisfy the
following properties:
(1) The profit function π(N,m) is continuous in m and it is maximised for m(0),
for any number N of competing firms; m(0) < 0 when firms compete in prices
and m(0) = 0 when firms compete in utilities.
(2) The profit function declines with the number of competing firms, for a given
mark-up m: π(N,m) > π(N + 1,m).
The notation m(0) above indicates the optimal mark-up chosen by incumbents
when they do not face entry, so that there are “0” possible entrants. Property (1) is
clearly satisfied by the model presented in Section 1 as it is simply a re-statement of
Proposition 1 and 2. Property (2) is quite natural, and it is easy to prove that the
equilibrium profit functions of Section 1 satisfy it, although parameter restrictions
would be required.14
From now on, we concentrate on the game when the strategic variable is net
utilities since it generates simpler results, but the arguments laid out below also
apply when firms compete in prices.15
Before studying the general case, we will illustrate the mechanisms at work. This
allows us to introduce some additional notation. To start with, imagine there are
only two incumbents. If they are not threatened by entry, they choosem(0) = 0 and
earn π(2,m(0)) each. However, incumbents may behave diﬀerently when they face
potential entrants. If the entry cost is very high, the entry threat is not credible,
and the two incumbents will continue with the optimal m(0) = 0. In particular,
the entrant cannot hope to recover its fixed cost when this is higher than Kb2 ≡
π(3,m(0)). For values of the entry cost above this level, K > Kb2, the entry of the
third firm is “blockaded”, even at the zero mark-up, which is the most convenient
for ex-post profitability. In other words, the industry is a “non-contestable natural
duopoly” and the two incumbents will not distort the mark-up.
When K < Kb2 the incumbents decide to modify the mark-up m. If the in-
cumbents keep charging the eﬃcient mark-up m(0) = 0, they will trigger entry of
a third firm and the incumbents’ profits will suddenly decline from π(2,m(0)) to
π(3,m(0)). Instead of accepting this discrete jump in profits, the incumbents have a
14From (11), when fims compete in utilities, it is immediately evident that it is suﬃcient that
either σ or N are high enough for Property (2) to hold true. It is possible to prove that these are
also suﬃcient conditions in the case of price competition when (5) applies.
15For instance,m(0) = 0 when firms compete in utilities, ∀N ; whilem(0) < 0 when firms compete
in prices, but the precise value of m may depend on N (but not always: for instance, Corollary 2
gives conditions such that m is always chosen to deliver a “bill-and-keep”, independently from N).
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better option: they can increase the industry access mark-up in order to make entry
unprofitable. Let us denote withm(1) the resulting value of the mark-up that deters
the first possible entrant. The incumbents increase the mark-up until the gross (ex
post) profit of the potential entrant under the distorted mark-up m(1) is equal to
the entrant’s entry cost, i.e., the mark up m(1) satisfies π(3,m(1)) = K. Having de-
terred the first possible entrant, the incumbents earn π(2,m(1)) > π(3,m(0)). This
inequality clearly holds for K close enough to Kb2, because, when K approaches
Kb2, m(1) must approach m(0) by construction and π(2,m(0)) > π(3,m(0)). The
continuity of the profit function ensures that there is always a range of fixed costs
below Kb2 such that deterrence must be the preferred option. In this range of en-
try costs, we can rightly talk of “entry deterrence”, as in the absence of strategic
manipulation of the mark-up the industry would be a “natural triopoly”. Instead,
incumbents distort the access mark-up and deter entry.
When the entry cost is lower than Kb2 the incumbents need to distort the mark-
up in order to keep the entrant out. However, this distortion also lowers the profit
of the incumbents themselves. In fact, at some stage the incumbents may give-up
the deterrence strategy, allow entry of the third firm and set the optimal m(0) for a
triopoly. The value of m at which incumbents “accommodate” entry is defined by
the indiﬀerence condition π(3,m(0)) = π(2,m∗). The corresponding limiting fixed
entry cost paid by the potential entrant is defined as Kd2 ≡ π(3,m∗). Thus, for all
values of K > Kd2 , entry is deterred.
For K < Kd2 there are two possible scenarios. The first scenario is the case when
Kd2 > K
b
3 ≡ π(4,m(0)). That is, the fixed entry cost associated to the mark-up
that makes the two incumbents indiﬀerent between deterring the third firm and
accommodating it with an optimal zero mark-up (Kd2 ) is bigger than the fixed entry
cost that blocks the entry of a fourth firm (Kb3). As a result, a second entrant (the
fourth firm overall) is blockaded because it cannot recover its fixed cost.
The second scenario occurs when K < Kd2 < K
b
3. Now the two incumbents could
accommodate the third firm and set a zero mark-up. However, this will trigger
the simultaneous entry of both the third and fourth firm. Instead, the incumbents
can do better by deterring both potential entrants. They achieve it by distorting
the mark-up even beyond m∗, to the level that just deters both entries, which is
found by solving π(4,m) = K. The value of m that solves this equation is denoted
by m(2), as it is the limiting mark-up that deters the first two possible entrants.
The incumbents, having deterred both entrants, then earn π(2,m(2)) > π(4,m(0)),
which is the maximum profit that can be obtained in a duopoly by distorting m.
Summing up all the previous results, the incumbents set the access charge in the
following way:
(1) if K > Kb2 the two incumbents set m(0) = 0 and entry of the third firm is
“blockaded”;
(2) if Kd2 < K < K
b
2 the two incumbents set m(1) > m(0) = 0 and entry of the
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third firm is “deterred”. The mark-up distortion increases for lower values of
K;
(3) when K < Kd2 there are two possible scenarios:
(3.1) if Kb3 < K < K
d
2 the two incumbents set m(0) = 0 and entry of the
third firm is “accommodated”. These three firms maintain the eﬃcient
zero mark-up and the fourth firm is “blockaded”. If K < Kb3, the same
reasoning can be repeated, now with three “eﬀective” incumbents who
have to decide whether to deter or accommodate the entry of a fourth
firm, and so on.
(3.2) if K < Kd2 < K
b
3 the two incumbents set m(2) > m(1) and entry of both
the third and the fourth firms is deterred.
Figure 1 illustrates the previous reasoning with an example where there are two
incumbents and only two potential entrants that compete in utilities.16 The left
panel plots the ex-post gross profits as a function of the mark-up. The three curves
show the profits corresponding to the possible market structures N = 2, 3, 4. The
right panel describes the optimal mark-up as a function of the fixed entry cost
K that is incurred by the entrants. In the example, Kb2 = 0.2; when K > K
b
2
entry is not a threat and incumbents set m(0) = 0. In the example, it is also
Kd2 = 0.016 > K
b
3 = 0.015. As a result, the incumbents find it optimal to deter
the third firm for Kd2 ≤ K < Kb2. In the range Kb3 ≤ K < Kd2 the fourth firm is
”blockaded”, thus the three eﬀective competing firms do not distort the mark-up and
set m(0) = 0. Finally, when K < Kb3 the incumbents accommodate the first entrant
but not the second: m is distorted and the second entrant is deterred. Only when
K is very low, K < Kd3 = 0.0125 do the incumbents give up any deterrence strategy,
accommodate both entrants, and set an industry mark-up equal to m(0) = 0.
Insert: Fig. 1. Profits (left panel) and mark-ups (right panel)
Notice that Figure 1 only reports positive distorted mark-ups, while in principle
there could be also symmetric solutions for negative values. These options are not
reported for two reasons. First, the marginal cost is typically not very high in
telecommunication networks. Hence negative mark-ups can easily imply negative
access charges which are diﬃcult to enforce.17 Operators may be limited to negative
16We consider a linear demand function for calls 1− p and a total marginal cost c = 0.2.
17Negative access charges would open the door to very strategic behaviour. For instance, an
operator could receive an arbitrarily large amount of money from the rival by placing an arbitrarily
large number of calls itself on the rival’s network.
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values that are bounded by a “bill-and-keep” system and thus the attempts to deter
entry would lose their power compared to positive mark-ups that do not face a similar
problem. Second, the previous argument is reinforced if the strategic variable is price
instead of utility. As we have explained in Section 1, when operators compete over
prices, they already set negative mark-ups in the absence of entry threats, and in
some cases this goes as far as a zero access charge (i.e., a “bill-and-keep” system).
In order to diminish the ex post profitability of entrants, operators can try to distort
the optimal mark-up only upwards and not downwards. In other words, distortions
away from the optimal “collusive” charge to deter entrants are much easier and
natural to implement by going to higher values of the access charge.
We complete the analysis with our final result, which illustrates how a generalised
number of incumbents establish an industry-wide access charge when they face the
threat of entry. Consider that there are n incumbents and a large number of possible
entrants. Denote as Kbn+j the limiting fixed entry cost that blocks the entry of the
j+1 entrant even at the optimal mark-up, i.e., Kbn+j ≡ π(n+j+1,m(0)), j = 0, 1, ...
The following proposition describes how the n incumbents set the access mark-up
and aﬀect subsequent entry.
Proposition 4. Imagine that the fixed entry cost is in the range Kbn+j+1 < K <
Kbn+j , j = 0, 1, ... The n incumbents set an industry-wide reciprocal access mark-
up m(d) that deters d ≤ j entrants, and accommodate j − d entrants, where m(d)
satisfies:
π(n+ j − d+ 1,m(d)) = K, where d = 0, 1, ..., j.
The optimal mark-up m(d) is the one that maximises the incumbents’ ex-post
individual profit:
π(n+ j − d,m(d))
and satisfies m(0) < m(1) < ... < m(j).
Proof . First, note that when Kbn+j+1 < K < K
b
n+j and m(0), j entrants will
enter while the (j+1)-th entrant will be blocked. Thus, the “natural” market struc-
ture in this range comprises n+ j firms. The n incumbents must decide whether to
accommodate all potential entrants, just a subset, or none. If they accommodate
all, then d = 0, there is no strategic reason to distort the mark-up and the incum-
bents earn π(n+ j,m(0)). If the incumbents deter all potential entrants, they must
guarantee that even the first possible entrant will not want to enter. For this reason,
they set the mark-upm(j) that deters entry of the first firm that brings the industry
structure to n+1 firms: π(n+1,m) = K. Having deterred all potential entrants, the
incumbents would earn an individual profit π(n,m(j)). In between these extreme
options, the incumbents can find it profitable to deter only a subset of d possible
entrants and accommodate j − d of them. To avoid entry of an additional firm, the
n+j−d eﬀective competitors establishm(d) where π(n+j−d+1,m(d)) = K. Each
of the incumbents then earns the profit corresponding to n+ j− d competing firms,
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π(n + j − d,m(d)). The most profitable strategy among these three possibilities
depends on the shape of the profit function π. ¥
3 Externalities and calling groups
In this section we allow for externalities and asymmetries in calling patterns. A
simplifying assumption of our model was that customers call every user randomly.
However, customers usually place a greater percentage of calls to a selected number
of people. For example, residential customers make most of their calls to “friends
and family” (F&F hereafter). In this situation, operators might find it profitable
to push up access charges so as to make people reluctant to change networks. In
fact, if all F&F belong to the same network, any single user will be very hesitant
to join another network if this means that the majority of calls to F&F are more
expensive oﬀ-net calls. We next explain that this reasoning is not entirely correct.
We show that without the threat of entry (or when entry is accommodated) there
is no reason to distort calling patterns. In such cases, a zero mark-up is negotiated,
and the presence of F&F alone is immaterial to this agreement. On the contrary,
when incumbents find it optimal to deter entry, an upward distortion of the access
mark-up arises once again. Actually, it turns out to be much easier to use the access
mark-up to deter entry when customers find it more diﬃcult to coordinate their
F&F network with the entrant than with the incumbents. In this situation, access
mark-ups can be used by incumbents to disadvantage the entrant.
To make these points formally, we extend our previous model imagining that
customers have biased calling patterns. We assume that consumers make a fraction
βi of calls to their own F&F when joining network i, while the remaining fraction
1 − βi of calls is placed randomly among everybody else. In the previous sections,
we assumed that customers make all calls randomly (there were no F&F circles, i.e.,
βi = 0).
We also assume that all members of the same F&F end up joining the same
network, and that there is no overlap between F&F groups. One could suppose
that, despite the absence of any explicit coordination, people belonging to the same
F&F group eventually join the same network if indeed calls end up being more
expensive oﬀ-net. Alternatively, F&F groups could be seen as a proxy for social
networks made of similar people with similar idiosyncratic preferences that lead
them to choose the same network. This implicit coordination assumption is not
necessary to obtain our results. However, it is convenient in our analysis because it
eliminates pay-oﬀ dominated equilibria that are due to coordination failures.18
18A more detailed study of consumer behaviour with calling groups (including the choice of being
a sender or a receiver) is in itself an interesting question that we must leave to further research.
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The net surplus for being subscribed to network i is
wi(pii, pij, τ i) = βiv(pii) + (1− βi)
NX
j=1
αjv(pij)− Fi + τ i.
The first term of this equation refers to the utility from making calls to F&F. As
F&F are all subscribed to the same network, all these calls are charged the on-net
price. The second term refers to the rest of the calls, which are randomly distributed
among all customers. These calls might be on-net or oﬀ-net. Notice that the presence
of F&F does not imply that people call more. Indeed, if the same price is charged
both on- and oﬀ-net, the presence of F&F does not change the total number of calls,
only the distribution of those calls.
As before, firms set call prices equal to the perceived marginal costs, that is,
pii = c on-net and pij = c(1 +m) oﬀ-net. With these prices the profit of firm i can
be written as




Everything else is as before. We consider once again the case of competition in
utilities and assume initially that all competing firms are symmetric with respect
to F&F (βi = β for all i). It is straightforward to extend the analysis conducted in
Section 1.2 and derive the fixed subscription fee in equilibrium:
Fi = f +
N
N − 1σ − (1− β)
(N − 2)cmq(c(1 +m)) + v(c)− v(c(1 +m))
N
.
The corresponding equilibrium profit is:
πi(N,m) =
σ




where ∆ is given again by eq. (10), with ∆ < 0 for all m 6= 0 and ∆ = 0 for m = 0.
These expressions have the very same structure as before, and thus we can reach
the same conclusions.
If entry is accommodated, the expression for the profit is maximised for m = 0,
and the F&F parameter, β, plays no role. If entry is to be deterred, the same
deterrence mechanism described in Section 2 can be put to work. For a given mark-
up, the presence of an F&F circle has an impact on profits. Since proportionally
more calls are made on-net, the distortion due to the mark-up has a smaller impact
on profits (in equation (12) ∆ is now multiplied by (1− β) < 1). For this very
reason, with F&F incumbents need a greater distortion in the mark-up to deter
entry. This does not imply that it is necessarily more costly for the incumbents
to deter the entrant, since the incumbents’ profits are less aﬀected by the mark-up
20
via the β. We have thus found that no mark-up is charged when entry is either
blockaded or accommodated, even in the presence of calling groups such as F&F.
When entry is deterred, a distortion in the uniform access mark-up is still an eﬀective
tool, though bigger distortions are needed.
Things change quite dramatically if we introduce an asymmetry between in-
cumbents’ and entrants’ F&F circles. The introduction of asymmetries generates
analytical solutions that are quite cumbersome, so it is more intuitive to illustrate
our results using diagrams for a simple case. Imagine there are three firms, two
incumbents (denoted as 1 and 2) and one entrant (denoted as 3). We assume that
F&F circles exist only for the incumbents and not for the entrant. Incumbents have
identical F&F circles (β1 = β2 = β) while the entrant has no F&F circle at all
(β3 = 0). This could reflect, for example, that the entrant has had insuﬃcient time
to establish a reputation that aﬀects calling behaviour. We do not model how repu-
tation can be built up, as we take for granted the process that leads people belonging
to the same group to coordinate implicitly on one of the incumbent networks. This
is obviously quite extreme, but captures the idea that an entrant has no history
and this generates a potential asymmetry that we capture in a lack of coordination
among potential F&F members when joining the entrant. What matters for our
results is not that the entrant has no calling circle at all but simply that it has a
smaller circle than the incumbents (β3 < β).
Given these assumptions, it is clear that a mark-up has a greater negative eﬀect
on the entrant than on the incumbents. This is not because of idiosyncratic pref-
erences (these are still symmetric), but due to the fact that, if a customer switches
to the entrant, more calls will be oﬀ-net calls, which are expensive when there is a
mark-up on the access charge. Incumbents, on the contrary, do have F&F circles
and proportionally more of their calls are on-net and cheaper. Of course, when
m = 0 both the entrant and the incumbents are again completely symmetric as
F&F groups do not matter when prices are uniform.
We have solved the model and report in Figure 2 the plot of the equilibrium
(gross) profits and market shares. The left panel plots profits for incumbents and
entrant for two diﬀerent values of β. The dotted curves are drawn for β = 0.2 (the
higher curve refers to the incumbents and the lower curve refers to the entrant),
while the continuous curves are drawn for β = 0.5 (again, the higher curve refers to
the incumbents and the lower curve refers to the entrant).
We can draw two implications, which emphasise once more the role of entry
deterrence. Although the incumbents suﬀer less than the entrant, they still suﬀer
from a mark-up. Therefore incumbents might prefer to accommodate entry and not
impose any mark-up, notwithstanding the ex ante F&F asymmetry. It is better for
them to accommodate entry, charging a common non-discriminatory m = 0, despite
the fact that this choice ends up washing away the ex ante asymmetry!
However, a deterrence strategy is much easier to implement in these circum-
stances for two reasons. Firstly, the entrant suﬀers seriously from any mark-up.
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The left panel of Figure 2 shows that the higher β is, the lower are the entrant’s
profits, which is the relevant payoﬀ to be considered for deterrence. Similarly, the
right panel shows that the entrant’s market share diminishes as β increases. Sec-
ondly, the incumbents suﬀer less from any mark-up. This can be easily seen as the
profits from successful deterrence are given by equation (12), which shows that the
negative impact of the mark-up summarised by ∆ < 0 is diluted by β.
In sum, tariﬀ-mediated network externalities, which indeed exist when firms
discriminate between on- and oﬀ-net traﬃc and may be particularly strong in the
presence of F&F circles, do not change our results. If entry is accommodated, there
are no strong reasons for the incumbents to distort upwards the mark-up, even if this
may amount to losing any ex ante F&F advantages incumbents might have. Mark-
ups as an entry-deterrence device are robust to the introduction of F&F. In fact, it
becomes even easier to implement this strategy if F&F groups put the entrant at
some disadvantage. Therefore calling externalities, alone, do not introduce a strong
motive to justify access mark-ups while, when conjoined with entry deterrence, they
are complementary to each other.19
Insert: Fig. 2. Profits (left panel) and market shares (right panel)
4 Conclusions
Two decades after the liberalisation of most telecommunications markets, regulators
are still concerned about the need to regulate access charges. High access charges
can increase operator’s retail prices and reduce consumer’s well-being. Moreover,
incumbent networks can use access charges to diminish competition in the existing
market and restrain the entry of new firms. The economic literature on “two-way”
interconnection has oﬀered ambiguous results concerning the way operators negoti-
ate reciprocal access charges in the absence of regulation. This paper has extended
the traditional duopoly model that analyses the negotiation of access charges to con-
sider the case of competition among multiple network. It has been shown that when
incumbents do not face entry threats, they establish an ineﬃcient access charge be-
low cost if they compete in price and an eﬃcient access charge equal to cost if they
19F&F together with switching costs may give a reason for incumbents to charge positive
markups, even in the absence of entry. If all members of a calling club are subscribing to the
same network, price discrimination will tend to increase individual switching costs, and this may
enable firms to charge higher fixed fees. To reach this result it is essential that some customers face
very high exogenous switching costs to make other people reluctant to relocate away from those
friends who are locked in. See Gabrielsen and Vagstad (2007).
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compete in utilities.
These results are general in the sense that they do not depend on the number of
competing networks. Yet these findings do not seem to confirm the typical regulatory
concerns that access charges are likely to be set too high (i.e., above cost) if they
are left unregulated. The second part of the paper has shown that this view can be
reconciled with our model when we allow for the possibility of entry. Under entry,
incumbent networks may decide to set an industry-wide (non-discriminatory) access
charge that accommodates all possible entrants or only a group of them, or may
decide to use the access charge to completely deter entry. The optimal strategy
for the incumbents is the solution of a trade-oﬀ. They can establish the eﬃcient
mark-up that maximises profits given the ex post number of firms, but this would
increase the profitability of entry. To avoid this, incumbents can distort the eﬃcient
mark-up, at the loss of their own ex post profits.
In order to assess the validity of our analysis, we emphasise that this trade-oﬀ
emerges regardless of the type of strategic interaction among incumbents. We have
also explained that the incumbents distort the mark-up upwards under both kinds
of strategic interaction (prices or utilities) when it pays for them to deter entrants.
However, the particular magnitude of the distortion (equivalently, the particular
level of the entry fixed cost that makes deterrence profitable) will be diﬀerent in
each case, since ex-post profits diﬀer depending on whether firms compete on prices
or utilities.
Notice that whenever incumbents increase the access charge above cost in order
to deter entrants, they introduce allocative distortions for calls, as the oﬀ-net price
is set above marginal cost. This behaviour also limits the gains from entry for
consumers. Thus above-cost access charges have bad properties from a normative
point of view. A general welfare analysis, however, is more complicated since in
standard logit models there is typically excessive entry as the business stealing eﬀect
prevails over the non-appropriation of consumer surplus. Thus entry-deterrence via
distorted mark-ups may improve welfare to the extent that it limits excessive entry.
23
References
[1] Anderson, S., A. de Palma and Thisse, J.-F. (1992). Discrete Choice Theory of
Product Diﬀerentiation,Cambridge (MA): The MIT Press.
[2] Armstrong, M. (1998). ‘Network Interconnection in Telecommunications’, Eco-
nomic Journal, vol. 108, pp. 545-564.
[3] Armstrong, M. (2002). ‘The Theory of Access Pricing and Interconnection’, in
(M. Cave et al., eds.), Handbook of Telecommunications Economics, Amster-
dam: North Holland.
[4] Armstrong, M. and Vickers, J. (2001). ‘Competitive Price Discrimination’,
RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 32, pp. 1-27.
[5] Atiyas, I. and Dogan, P. (2006). ‘When Good Intentions Are Not Enough:
Sequential Entry and Competition in the Turkish Mobile Industry’, mimeo,
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
[6] Berger, U. (2004). ‘Bill-and-keep vs. cost-based access pricing revisited’, Eco-
nomics Letters, vol. 86, pp. 107-112.
[7] Bernheim, B.D. (1984). ‘Strategic Deterrence of Sequential Entry into an In-
dustry’, RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 15, pp. 1-11.
[8] Carter, M. and Wright, J. (2003). ‘Asymmetric Network Interconnection’, Re-
view of Industrial Organization, vol. 22, pp. 27-46.
[9] de Palma, A. and Leruth, L. (1993). ‘Equilibrium in Competing Networks with
Diﬀerentiated Products’, Transportation Science, vol. 27, pp. 73-80.
[10] Doganoglu, T. and Tauman, Y. (2002). ‘Network Competition and Access
Charges Rules’, The Manchester School, vol. 70, pp. 16-35.
[11] Gabrielsen, T.S. and Vagstad, S. (2007, forthcoming). ‘Why is on-net traﬃc
cheaper than oﬀ-net traﬃc? Access markup as a collusive device’, European
Economic Review.
[12] Gans, J. and King, S. (2001). ‘Using “bill and keep” interconnect arrangements
to soften network competition’, Economics Letters, vol. 71, pp. 413-421.
[13] Jeon, D.S. (2006). ‘A Simple Access Pricing Rule to Achieve the Ramsey Out-
come in Two-Way Access’, mimeo, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
[14] Jeon, D.S., Laﬀont, J.-J. and Tirole, J. (2004). ‘On the “Receiver-Pays” Prin-
ciple’, RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 35, pp. 85-110.
24
[15] Laﬀont, J.-J., Rey, P. and Tirole, J. (1998a). ‘Network competition I: Overview
and non-discriminatory pricing’, RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 29, pp. 1-37.
[16] Laﬀont, J.-J., Rey, P. and Tirole, J. (1998b). ‘Network competition II: Price
discrimination’, RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 29, pp. 38-56.
[17] Laﬀont, J.-J. and Tirole, J. (2000). Competition in Telecommunications, Cam-
bridge (MA): The MIT Press.
[18] Peitz, M., Valletti, T.M. and Wright, J. (2004). ‘Competition in Telecommu-
nications: an Introduction’, Information Economics and Policy, vol. 16, pp.
315-321.
[19] Reitzes, J. and Woroch, G. (2006). ‘Competing for Exclusive Customers: A
Discrete-Continuous Model’, mimeo, University of California - Berkeley.
[20] Rochet, J.-C. and Stole, L. (2002). ‘Nonlinear Pricing with Random Participa-
tion’, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 69, pp. 277-311.
[21] Valletti, T.M. and Cambini, C. (2005). ‘Investment and Network Competition’,
RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 36, pp. 446-467.
[22] Vogelsang, I. (2003). ‘Price Regulation of Access to Telecommunications Net-
works’, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. XLI, pp. 830-862.
[23] Yin, X. (2004). ‘Two-part tariﬀ competition in duopoly’, International Journal

























































0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
m
0.325
0.33
0.335
0.34
share
 
 
Figure 2 
